Medical Disorder Is Not a Black Box Essentialist Concept

Review of Defining Mental Disorder: Jerome Wakefield and His Critics, edited by Luc Faucher and Denis Forest

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5195/pom.2023.165

Keywords:

Concepts of health and disease, conceptual analysis, philosophy of psychiatry

References

Boorse, Christopher. 1977. “Health as a Theoretical Concept.” Philosophy of Science 44, no. 4: 542–573. https://doi.org/10.1086/288768.

Deutsch, Max. 2021. “Conceptual Analysis without Concepts.” Synthese 198, no. 11: 11125–11157. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02775-0.

Faucher, Luc and Denis Forest, eds. 2021. Defining Mental Disorder: Jerome Wakefield and His Critics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. https://direct.mit.edu/books/book/5015/Defining-Mental-DisorderJerome-Wakefield-and-His.

Garson, Justin. 2019. “There Are No Ahistorical Theories of Function.” Philosophy of Science 86, no. 5: 1146–1156. https://doi.org/10.1086/705472.

Godman, Marion, Antonella Mallozzi, and David Papineau. 2020. “Essential Properties Are Super-Explanatory: Taming Metaphysical Modality.” Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6, no. 3: 316–334. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/apa.2019.48.

Kripke, Saul A. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Machery, Edouard. 2009. Doing Without Concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Millikan, Ruth Garrett. 1989. “In Defense of Proper Functions.” Philosophy of Science 56, no. 2: 288–302. https://doi.org/10.1086/289488.

———. 2000. On Clear and Confused Ideas: An Essay about Substance Concepts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511613296.

———. 2017. Beyond Concepts: Unicepts, Language, and Natural Information. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Neander, Karen. 1991. “Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst’s Defense.” Philosophy of Science 58, no. 2: 168–184. https://doi.org/10.1086/289610.

Papineau, David. 2009. “The Poverty of Analysis.” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83, no. 1: 1–30. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8349.2009.00170.x.

Putnam, Hilary. 1975. “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’.” In Mind, Language, and Reality, Philosophical Papers vol. 2, 215–271. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625251.014.

Sawyer, Sarah. 2020. “Truth and Objectivity in Conceptual Engineering.” Inquiry 63, nos. 9–10: 1001–1022. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2020.1805708.

Wakefield, J.C. 1992. “The Concept of Mental Disorder: On the Boundary between Biological Facts and Social Values.” American Psychologist 47, no. 3: 373–388. https://doi.org/10.1037//0003-066x.47.3.373.

———. 1999a. “Evolutionary versus Prototype Analyses of the Concept of Disorder.” Journal of Abnormal Psychology 108, no. 3: 374–399. https://doi.org/10.1037//0021-843x.108.3.374.

———. 1999b. “Mental Disorder as a Black Box Essentialist Concept.” Journal of Psychopathology and Clinical Science 108, no. 3: 465–472. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.108.3.465.

———. 2000. “Aristotle as Sociobiologist: The ‘Function of a Human Being’ Argument, Black Box Essentialism, and the Concept of Mental Disorder.” Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology 7, no. 1: 17–44. https://muse.jhu.edu/article/28337.

———. 2014. “The Biostatistical Theory versus the Harmful Dysfunction Analysis, Part 1: Is Part-Dysfunction a Sufficient Condition for Medical Disorder?” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 39, no. 6: 648–682. https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhu038.

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Published

2023-07-31

How to Cite

Fagerberg, H. (2023). Medical Disorder Is Not a Black Box Essentialist Concept : Review of Defining Mental Disorder: Jerome Wakefield and His Critics, edited by Luc Faucher and Denis Forest. Philosophy of Medicine, 4(1). https://doi.org/10.5195/pom.2023.165

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Section

Book Reviews