What Health Is

The Blueprint View

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5195/pom.2026.260

Keywords:

Concepts of health and disease, Biological Function, Dysfunction, Naturalism, Abilities, Design

Abstract

This paper introduces the line-drawing challenge for ability-based accounts of health. What degree of which abilities is required for complete health? I argue that the answers provided by existing theories are flawed and propose the Blueprint View. On this view, an organism is completely healthy if and only if it has the abilities it would have in its design state, where design is determined by the etiology of its traits. This view provides an objective, naturalistic distinction between health and non-health. It strikes a balance between pure physiology and well-being, and distinguishes treatment from enhancement, as well as real pathology from pathologized variation.

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Published

2026-04-28

How to Cite

Hundertmark, F. (2026). What Health Is: The Blueprint View. Philosophy of Medicine, 7(1). https://doi.org/10.5195/pom.2026.260

Issue

Vol. 7 No. 1 (2026)

Section

Original Research Articles (health, disease and illness)

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Copyright (c) 2026 Fabian Hundertmark

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